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Finance, Industrial Organization, Theory
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Default Risk Surprises in Banks’ Loan Pricing
In the loan market, similar firms pay different rates, even when they borrow the same loan type from the same bank. Do these differentials reflect market imperfections, or information banks have and the econometrician does not? Using two million French loans from 2006–2024 matched to firms’ credit ratings assigned by Banque de France, I show that rate differentials predict subsequent changes in firms’ credit risk. On average, firms whose default probability increases by 1 p.p. one year after loan issuance were charged an otherwise unexplained 0.04 p.p. rate premium at issuance. The premium doubles for younger and smaller firms, strengthens in crises and at longer maturities. The positive relationship is consistent with banks having information that the econometrician does not observe; yet, it can also emerge in a market with search frictions, when banks’ pricing strategies induce partial separation. I bring these forces together in a search model of loan pricing with asymmetric information in which banks see an imperfect public signal of firms’ risk types. Calibrating the model within each rating class, I find that banks are informed and separate borrowers in the safest classes but are uninformed and pool them in the riskiest, and search frictions explain most of the dispersion.