Yucheng Quan

University of Hong Kong · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Environmental & Energy

Job market paper

(De)regulating Information Intermediaries: Theory and Evidence from China’s Environmental Impact Assessment Industry

Information intermediaries combine three market failures: concentrated supply, quality that clients cannot verify, and costs borne by third parties. Competition addresses the first but can worsen the other two. I study China's 2019 abolition of licensing for environmental impact assessment agencies, which increased the number of agencies more than sixfold. Using confidential records of 628,669 environmental penalties and an instrument based on pre-reform interprovincial trade in assessments, I find that entry lowered prices and concentration but reduced report quality, increased the number of projects built without any assessment, and worsened local air quality. Evasion responded most strongly among small and young firms. A model in which entry dilutes the reputational return to quality shows that the welfare-maximizing entry barrier rises with information asymmetry and externalities.