Jinyuqi Huang

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Behavioral & Experimental, Theory

Job market paper

Role Uncertainty and Punishment Severity in Repeated Cheap Talk: Theory and Experiment

We investigate the efficacy of the shadow of the future in sustaining information transmission under partially aligned interests by manipulating two institutional features: punishment severity and role uncertainty. While theory suggests that these features potentially facilitate fully revealing equilibria relative to a baseline of fixed roles and mild punishment, our experiment documents an asymmetric effect on sender and receiver behavior. Harsh punishment with fixed roles disciplines senders but fails to elicit trust from receivers. Conversely, mild punishment with role uncertainty fosters trust rather than honesty, supporting an outcome where senders obtain their preferred action without needing to be truthful. The combination of both features asymmetrically improves subjects' honesty as senders yet fails to elicit receivers' trust. Our findings imply that mechanisms aiming for truthful and efficient communication must carefully tailor incentives for both roles, rather than relying solely on disciplining the informed sender.