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Industrial Organization, Applied Micro
Job market paper
Concentration without Greater Market Power? Evidence from U.S. Sugar’s Acquisition of Imperial Sugar
The Department of Justice sued to block U.S. Sugar's acquisition of Imperial Sugar, arguing that it would raise the price of refined sugar in the Southeast. This paper asks whether retail sugar prices in that region rose as the merger of the two refiners moved from announcement through litigation to closing, and why they did not. Using NielsenIQ Retail Scanner data from 2016 to 2022, I compare the Southeast with the rest of the country in each phase of the case and find no relative price increase in any of them. The relative decline that does appear is concentrated in store brands, which account for most of the category. I then estimate a mixed logit demand model and recover markups under multiproduct Bertrand competition. Measured over the firms that set retail prices the market is highly concentrated, with a Herfindahl–Hirschman index averaging 2,849, but the transaction changes that index by 0.2 points, against the 100-point threshold in the 2023 Merger Guidelines. Diversion from the acquired brands to the acquirer's is 2.6 percent outside the Southeast and 0.5 percent within it, and margins are no higher after the announcement than before. The merging firms are small in a concentrated retail market, so a screen built on the level of concentration flags this transaction and one built on diversion does not, and retail prices side with the second. A retail screen needs only scanner data, so it complements a screen on refining when wholesale prices and contracts are unobserved.