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Latent Statecraft: Political Alignment in the Shadow of Tariffs
Tariffs have long been understood as a tool of economic statecraft, used not only to manage trade but to extract political returns from trading partners. This may be why tariff-cut commitments so often look lopsided: a hegemon may offer periphery countries deeper cuts than it receives in return, with the imbalance possibly compensated on a different margin, namely political concessions. Using the United States as the hegemon and UN General Assembly voting as our measure of political concessions, we measure economic concessions as the terms-of-trade effect of bilateral tariff cuts and exploit variation in their value over time. We find that periods of larger tariff concessions from the U.S. are also periods of greater political concessions by periphery countries. This holds even absent new tariff policy: a tariff schedule's economic value is continuously revalued by shifting trade patterns, and the political returns to a concession made years earlier track this revaluation.