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Geoeconomic Coercion: Which Target, Who Pays?
This paper studies the incidence of economic sanctions, across countries and within each of them. I document that sanctions have increasingly targeted firms rather than entire sectors, a substitution unexplained by geopolitical factors. I develop a two-country model of sanctions with heterogeneous firms, international input sourcing and oligopolistic competition. Competition with unaffected rivals limits the ability of a targeted firm to pass the sanction cost on to consumers, forcing it to absorb much of the shock through lower profits. A sectoral sanction raises every firm’s cost uniformly, and consumers bear a larger share of the sanction cost. In firm-level sanctions, maximizing the damage to the targeted firm compared to collateral damages requires targeting the largest firm in a sector. Simulations of the general equilibrium show that firm-level sanctions cost the target economy four times what they cost the sanctioning economy, against eleven under sectoral sanctions. A government maximizing damage inflicted per unit borne would therefore choose the sectoral design. Policymakers nonetheless use firm-level sanctions, suggesting that they also consider who bears the cost within the target economy.