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Political Economy, Development, Applied Micro
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Accountability without rule of law: how judicial centralization shapes local governance in China
This paper studies how government control of the judiciary affects political accountability under an authoritarian political system. I propose a model where local governments choose the amount of action taken against citizens, which are litigable in courts controlled either by local governments themselves or higher-level governments. The model predicts that, as a result of centralizing judicial control, courts become stricter towards local governments, but only when the interests of local and higher-level governments diverge. Instability decreases and local fiscal revenue falls when courts are stricter, but the amount of governmental action increases because local governments double down to make up for the lost revenue. Empirically, using a judicial centralization reform in China, I validate the predictions of the model by showing that centralization made local governments more likely to lose in administrative lawsuits, but the effect becomes negligible for cases with high political sensitivity where the interests of local and provincial governments align. The number of labor protests fell, local governments' discretionary fiscal revenue decreased, but the amount of land requisition increased. These results illustrate the limits of top-down accountability without the rule of law.