Yingfei Mu

Johns Hopkins University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Behavioral & Experimental, Environmental & Energy

Job market paper

Competition and Punishment in Expert Markets

In expert markets, the consumer may lack the ability to find out whether a provider’s recommendation is truthful or not. We study a binary environment in which a fraudulent recommendation can be detected only after receiving conflicting recommendations. We characterize the truthful, babbling and probabilistic fraud equilibria, and study how the magnitude of punishment affects fraud. Stronger punishment expands the region in which truthful revelation can be sustained, but need not reduce fraud along an probabilistic fraud equilibrium. Depending on search costs, equilibrium fraud may increase or decrease with punishment. When search costs are sufficiently high, the surviving probabilistic fraud equilibrium converges toward babbling as punishment becomes arbitrarily large. Although the nominal punishment can be arbitrarily large, the expected punishment conditional on fraud remains bounded.