Hamza Syed

London School of Economics · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Development, Urban & Regional, Political Economy, Environmental & Energy, Applied Micro

Job market paper

Discrimination, Preferences, and Residential Sorting: Evidence from Delhi’s Rental Housing Market

Where a household lives shapes almost everything we care about: education, labour, health, environment, public services. But we observe segregation in several cities. Residential segregation is an equilibrium outcome of what households want and what the market will let them have, but the two halves are usually measured on different people. This paper measures both on the same households and neighbourhoods, using in-person surveys of 3,290 households and 619 rental brokers across Delhi through three randomised experiments. It finds that, first, changing an applicant's name from Hindu (majority) to Muslim (minority) lowers the probability of acceptance by about 22 percentage points, and almost all of that is outright refusal rather than a higher rent. Second, brokers report that a Muslim family could rent 24 of 100 local properties against 86 for an upper-caste Hindu family, and this gap is across the city. Third, when every option is stipulated to be available, 51 per cent of Muslim respondents choose a mixed or majority-Hindu neighbourhood, twice the share of the dominant upper-caste Hindu respondents willing to live outside their own group's areas. Combining the two measurements in a sorting model, the paper separates the constraint into its layers: 62 per cent of the access gap is attributable to landlords and resident associations and 38 per cent to brokers' own screening. Removing that excess would widen the accessible stock for Muslims by 25%, and enforcement directed at ten colonies would deliver half the benefit of enforcing everywhere. Equalising access would reduce segregation only modestly though, because the force separating the groups is the majority's avoidance of Muslim areas.