Sebastian Ernst

London School of Economics · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Public, Industrial Organization, Labor

Job market paper

Caring What It Costs: Subsidy Design in Child Care

Child care subsidies can generate large positive externalities by promoting human capital development. An important and understudied feature of their design is the extent to which recipients are shielded from price differences. Such shielding can generate social gains by encouraging the use of higher-quality care, but may also raise equilibrium prices when providers have market power. Using administrative data and quasi-experimental variation from the United States, I show that reducing recipients' exposure to price differences shifts them toward providers with higher prices and higher quality ratings. Then, in a novel application of bunching methods, I estimate that providers charge 15 percent more when subsidy recipients are fully shielded from price differences than when they are fully exposed to them. To evaluate policy alternatives, I estimate a structural model of child care demand and supply. I compare a benchmark policy based on federal guidelines, which substantially shields recipients from price differences, with an equally costly fixed subsidy that leaves them fully exposed to those differences. The benchmark policy shifts more subsidized children into high-quality care, but reduces both overall child care use and consumer surplus for subsidized and unsubsidized families. Finally, when quality is observable, I find that tying subsidies directly to quality is more efficient than tying subsidies to price across a wide range of policy specifications.