Lucia Contreras

University of Manchester · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Public, Development

Job market paper

Less Simple, Less Distortionary? Evidence from Costa Rica’s Corporate Tax Reform

Simple but distortionary tax designs are widely used in the taxation of firms in developing economies. This paper examines whether less simple designs, which can reduce these distortions, introduce new ones as firms face less simple tax incentives. We study Costa Rica's 2020 Corporate Income Tax reform, which replaced a simple but highly distortionary notched schedule with a less simple kinked one. Using the variation in tax rates it created across firms, we show that firms react to the right incentives by adjusting their reported profits to changes in marginal tax rates, not in average tax rates, without the average-rate mistakes documented for individuals. Responses to tax cuts and increases are also symmetric, with elasticities of reported profits of about 3.1–3.2, suggesting that the concern raised for other taxes, that reversing a tax change may not undo its effects, may be smaller for corporate taxes. Bunching below the replaced notch and cost inflation above it also disappeared, and little or no bunching emerged at the new profit thresholds. We argue that less simple tax designs can reduce distortions without firms misreading their incentives, and should hence be considered in developing countries as a more economically efficient alternative.