Ayman Tibi

University of Mannheim · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

International, Development, Public, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

The Economics of a Trade Policy for Peace

Countries may use trade agreements to promote peaceful relations among allies and advance geopolitical interests. I study the U.S.-sponsored Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) agreement, which grants Egyptian firms tariff-free access to the U.S. market conditional on sourcing a share of their inputs from Israel. Stricter sourcing requirements increase the share of inputs from Israel by firms using the agreement but also raise the costs of utilizing the agreement, therefore potentially limiting aggregate imports from Israel. Using difference-in-differences strategies, I find that the agreement generated persistent increases in Egyptian exports to the U.S. and imports from Israel, alongside export spillovers to non-U.S. destinations. To quantify welfare effects and evaluate alternative input requirements, I develop a quantitative trade model in which Egyptian firms endogenously choose whether to use the QIZ agreement. Calibrating the model to Egypt, I find positive but modest aggregate welfare gains, since QIZ sourcing distortions partly offset the benefits from U.S. market access. Counterfactual results suggest that relaxing the Israeli input requirement can increase Egyptian exports and welfare while also increasing imports from Israel, since the expansion in exports more than offsets the reduction in Israeli input shares. Yet, the U.S. may not favor such a reform if its geopolitical benefits do not outweigh the economic costs of increased Egyptian exports.