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Finance, Industrial Organization
Job market paper
Public Markets for Litigation Finance
We study emerging public markets for legal cases and how they affect financing decisions and settlement bargaining. We provide a theoretical model in which a risk-averse plaintiff sells a share of case proceeds to risk-averse and informed investors, and then bargains with a defendant. In both public and private markets, financing induces a legal friction by reducing the plaintiff’s exposure to trial risk, strengthening his bargaining position and making costly court trial more likely. Its strategic use induces a financial friction. The plaintiff anticipates the commitment benefit and sells more than efficient risk sharing would justify, which further enhances the legal friction. In public markets, prices add information but need not foster agreement. A sufficiently informative public price may increase trial incidence relative to private financing and can induce the plaintiff to sell a larger share. The litigant-welfaremaximizing cap on the proceeds sold is always binding below the efficient risk-sharing benchmark.