Kevin Mi

Michigan State University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Theory

Job market paper

AI Search Features and Quality Degradation

Search platforms, such as Google and Bing, increasingly answer queries with artificial intelligence (AI) search features that scrape and synthesize content from online publishers. In this paper, I develop a theoretical model to examine how the introduction of AI search features affects content investment decisions, platform design choices, and welfare. Improvement in AI content quality enhances users' direct benefit from the search platform but can also divert users away from publishers' sites. Consequently, it erodes the publishers' incentives to invest in high-quality content and, in turn, reduces the quality of the AI content. In the face of this tradeoff, I show that introducing an AI search feature improves user surplus but may reduce social welfare if publishers sufficiently value user clicks. Furthermore, I analyze how this tradeoff shapes the platform's choice of AI search quality. Finally, I apply the model to evaluate several proposed policies for regulating AI search features. I find that copyright restrictions can implement the socially optimal outcome; platform competition and pay-per-crawl payments may reduce social welfare; opt-out options have ambiguous effects on welfare; and licensing deals can improve welfare, although the optimal form of licensing depends on market conditions.