Patrick Massey

Michigan State University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Education, Labor, Public

Job market paper

Teacher Sorting and Preferences over School Disadvantage: Evidence from Performance Pay in Texas

In this paper I study how performance-based compensation affects teacher mobility and sorting using the Texas Teacher Incentive Allotment (TIA), a statewide program introduced in 2019. TIA gives teachers a tiered quality designation, Recognized, Exemplary, or Master, based on performance evaluations and value-added measures. These designations are portable across schools and come with a salary supplement that rises with school disadvantage and rural status. Using administrative data on Texas public school teachers, I combine a staggered difference-in-differences event-study design with a discrete choice model of school choice that allows for heterogeneous teacher preferences over school SES. I find that designation reduces mobility on net: teachers must remain in their district to collect the first allotment, and the recovery in mobility afterward does not offset the moves foregone during that year. Designation shifts teachers toward more advantaged campuses: designated teachers become substantially less likely to leave already-advantaged schools, while exits from the highest-need schools fall only in the first designation year. This response is ordered by designation level, with Recognized teachers becoming more mobile and sorting toward advantage while Master teachers become less mobile and less likely to leave disadvantaged campuses. Preference estimates imply that the average designated teacher would require roughly $6,940 more per year to accept a school with conditions associated with a 20 percentage point higher economically disadvantaged share. While the salary gradient created by TIA falls short of that benchmark at every tier, but the gap is smallest at the highest tier. These results suggest that TIA's portable credential expands effective teachers' outside options at the levels where the pay gradient is shallowest and that the gradient becomes steep enough to hold teachers at disadvantaged campuses only at the highest tier.