Aaron Berman

MIT · Economics · 2026–27 job market · Postdoc

Fields

Environmental & Energy, International, Development

Job market paper

Pay a Man to Fish: Subsidies, Trade, and Cooperation in the Global Commons

Contemporary environmental issues are global in scope, but international cooperation to address them has often remained elusive, resulting in resource depletion across a range of common-pool settings. In this paper, I study whether and how trade agreements can achieve conservation objectives. I develop a model of trade policy in which countries share a renewable resource stock and trade the output. Production subsidies impose externalities on trading partners both through the world price and directly through the shared stock, which changes both unilaterally optimal policy and the incentives to cooperate. To quantify the objects in my model, I assemble a new geospatial panel of the global tuna industry, linking GPS-derived vessel tracks with harmonized administrative catch and effort records. I present evidence that additional fishing pressure lowers contemporaneous fishing productivity for all vessels in a given ground. I then estimate supply from vessels' location, participation, and trip-length choices and demand using ocean-climate shocks as price instruments, and leverage an industry-standard biological model to estimate the dynamics of stock regrowth. I embed these estimates in a dynamic game in which governments set trade and fisheries policy over shared tuna stocks. Acting unilaterally, governments deliver less than a fifth of the conservation gains of a global planner. Most of the gains from cooperation come from stock conservation rather than terms-of-trade adjustment. Because tariffs set to manipulate the terms of trade also restrict fishing, trade liberalization alone lowers both welfare and stocks; most of the welfare gains lie in disciplining fishing on shared grounds alongside trade.