Dean Li

MIT · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Labor, Industrial Organization, Health

Job market paper

Worker Training and Firm Screening: Evidence from Hospital Technologies

Workers accumulate specific skills through work experience, and firms often screen for workers with precisely those skills. On-the-job training may therefore have value through future job offers, which in turn shape which firms compete for workers. I study how on-the-job training affects worker choice sets in hospital nursing labor markets, where hospitals value experience with their electronic health record (EHR) platform but do not compensate this experience with higher wages. Instead, the returns to training are reflected in sorting. An event study around EHR adoption shows that training increases nurses' probabilities of moving to a same-technology hospital by 20 percent. A dynamic labor supply model with firm screening, identified using vacancy shocks to relax hospital screening and commuting distance to shift workers' job valuations, attributes most of this sorting to additional job offers rather than worker preferences for familiar technologies. Training in the most common local EHR system is worth approximately $16,000 (about 20 percent of the average annual RN salary) to new nurses. Because additional offers expand workers' outside options, training makes new nurses more wage-elastic on average toward same-system hospitals, the opposite sign of the standard full-choice-set model prediction. Finally, the specificity of training shapes whether it creates lock-in or strengthens competition.