Kazuatsu Shimizu

MIT · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

International, Macroeconomics

Job market paper

The Keynesian Case for Trade Protection: A Modern Treatment

We revisit the Keynesian rationale for tariffs: when downward nominal wage rigidity creates inefficient employment losses, tariffs can serve as second-best instruments by expanding labor demand in affected sectors. To do so, we characterize optimal tariffs in a dynamic multisector economy with wage rigidities and a flexible exchange rate. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show analytically that tariffs can be counterproductive instruments: a broad tariff intervention reduces labor demand in the very sectors it is meant to protect, as currency appreciation depresses foreign import demand and discourages current spending. As a result, optimal policy calls for import subsidies across sectors when wage rigidity causes employment shortfalls across a sufficiently broad segment of the economy. Second, we undertake a quantitative evaluation of optimal trade policy and find that, even when positive tariffs are justified, their optimal magnitudes remain small in our U.S. application across shocks that induce sizable labor-market distortions. This is because tariffs have limited effectiveness in shifting employment across sectors relative to the distortions they create. The resulting welfare gains are therefore modest.