Sivakorn Sanguanmoo

MIT · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

Robustness and Simple Contracts in Sequential Screening

Sellers often contract with buyers before buyers learn their valuations, but observed contracts are usually simpler than the theory of Bayesian sequential screening predicts. To explain this gap, we study a sequential-screening environment in which the seller knows the buyer’s initial willingness to pay and the distribution of his final valuation (demand), but not how the buyer learns. The seller maximizes her worst-case profit over all information structures consistent with what she knows. Under natural conditions on cost and the shape of demand, a single refund contract that the buyer always accepts is essentially the unique robustly optimal mechanism. When these conditions fail, a menu of non-refundable and refundable contracts can dominate all single refund contracts. We quantify how much the seller gains from knowing how the buyer learns and show that this knowledge can also raise total welfare.