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Macroeconomics, Finance, Theory
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Expectations and the Transmission of Monetary Policy
Monetary policy decisions affect economic activity largely by shifting expectations. Central banks base these decisions on imperfect and persistent real-time assessments of economic conditions. This paper studies monetary policy design when decisions partially reveal these assessments, changing market expectations of future policy. Policy responses to demand and productive capacity assessments shape the market interpretation of decisions and hence their effects. We identify a novel form of time inconsistency rooted in the imperfect and private nature of real-time assessments. Under discretion, the central bank chooses rates after forming its assessments, taking as given markets' interpretation of decisions. By committing to a rule beforehand, it accounts for how the rule shapes that interpretation. Discretion leaves the economy inefficiently exposed to assessment errors. In particular, expectations can be excessively sensitive to policy surprises. We quantify this inefficiency in a New Keynesian model estimated using U.S. data, including Fed forecast revisions and inflation expectations' sensitivity to policy surprises. The optimal commitment rule sharply lowers the response to productive capacity assessments relative to demand, greatly improving stabilization. Markets then attribute less of a policy surprise to errors about productive capacity, which are slow to correct, dampening expectation revisions and their effects on inflation and output.