Whitney Zhang

MIT · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Labor

Job market paper

Adversarial Hiring

Worker and firm technology choices increasingly intermediate the hiring process, yet little is known about their equilibrium consequences. We model screening as a game in which technology choices alter the information environment and firms endogenously set screening policies. The model distinguishes technologies that enhance the informativeness of applicant signals from those that erode them. We study two such technologies, applicant adoption of generative AI and firm adoption of automated assessments. We construct a new panel of interview processes tied to hiring outcomes covering nearly 10,000 firms comprising 12% of US employment. Tracking changes in workers’ resumes over time, we find that AI-induced text homogenization erodes signal. In occupations with fewer AI-proof signals, firms respond by relying more on experience and credentials, sourcing candidates more through referrals and recruiters, intensifying interviews, and ultimately reducing the quantity and diversity of entry-level hires. Conversely, earlier firm adoption of automated assessments enhanced signals, facilitating increased hiring and improving diversity on some dimensions. Our results offer a unified account of how technology has changed hiring across two eras—including explaining one-quarter of the relative slowdown in entry-level hiring since 2022—and show that technology can reduce welfare in adversarial settings.