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Macroeconomics, Environmental & Energy, Public
Job market paper
Optimal Carbon Tax with Dynamic Skill Heterogeneity
Extending a dynamic Mirrlees model to two goods, one polluting, this paper studies optimal carbon taxation with redistribution. I find that carbon taxes should be nonlinear and age-dependent when labor is distorted and consumption goods differ in their labor complementarity. The social cost of carbon also reflects the effect of pollution on work incentives. When labor and savings wedges are fixed, carbon taxation can partially offset these constraints. In a US calibration, when income taxes can be adjusted, I find that the best linear carbon tax captures 99% of the welfare gains of a nonlinear carbon tax. When income wedges are fixed at US-calibrated levels, age-dependent carbon taxes capture 74% of the welfare gain from moving from linear to nonlinear carbon taxation. However, these gains are small compared with those of modest income tax reforms, suggesting that greater flexibility in carbon pricing is a poor substitute for income tax reform.