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Environmental & Energy, Applied Micro
Job market paper
Asymmetric Information and Costly Participation in Voluntary Conservation Markets
Emissions trading systems now cover roughly 30% of global greenhouse gas emissions, and offsets promise substantial gains from trade between capped sectors and cheaper abatement elsewhere. I extend van Benthem and Kerr's (2013) model of nature-based offset supply: landowners hold private information about the commercial value of their land and respond to a uniform baseline-price mechanism, but must also pay a privately known fixed cost to participate. The private information and the costly participation—acting alone—reduce the social value of such a market, but are not socially harmful. Together, however, they can be. I show that an offset market can be strictly welfare-reducing, so that closing it dominates every active policy. The two frictions play distinct roles: private information about the commercial value governs who is drawn into the market, costly participation determines how much welfare they create. Because willingness to participate is highest for those landowners with the least commercially valuable land, the landowners who are the hardest to exclude from a market are precisely those who generate the lowest social value. Two further results follow. The optimal baseline plays a screening role absent from current protocols; and the optimal price may lie strictly below the Pigouvian benchmark, separating welfare-positive from welfare-negative landowners by exploiting differences in their willingness to participate at differing levels of policy stringency. Improving baseline accuracy, the focus of recent policy debate, is therefore necessary but not sufficient to make these markets work.