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Macroeconomics, Finance
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Credit Ratings and Financial Vulnerability
Credit ratings shape firms’ financing conditions, yet they often diverge from fundamental default risk. Using Norwegian firm data, I show that fundamentals predict bankruptcy even within identical agency rating categories. Mapping out-of-sample default predictions onto the rating scale, I construct a fundamentals-based rating. Holding true risk constant, firms with higher agency ratings enjoy lower borrowing costs and faster debt growth, especially among small businesses. In a heterogeneous-firm model where assessments shape borrowing and credit allocation, an economy with imperfect ratings suffers far higher downturn credit losses than a fundamentals-based one, despite only slightly higher total debt, with two-thirds of the extra losses driven by lending to riskier firms. Yet macroeconomic amplification is shock-dependent: while inherited debt deepens distress, ongoing rating-based pricing partly shields borrowers during productivity slumps, whereas it offers little support when bank-capital losses raise lenders’ required returns. Consequently, imperfect ratings amplify investment drops far more after bank-capital shocks than productivity shocks.