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Development, Labor
Job market paper
Social Frictions and Job Information Sharing: Experimental Evidence from Informal Labor Markets in India
Social networks help workers find jobs, but workers may hesitate to share job information if they fear being blamed when a job they pass along turns out badly. We study whether such anticipated blame limits sharing in informal labor markets in India. In a field experiment with 620 daily-wage workers at 32 spot labor markets in Delhi, we offer workers a one-day paid job and ask them to name another worker who could be offered the same job in the future. We randomize whether the named worker will be told who provided his name (attributed) or not (anonymous). Anonymity increases the probability of naming another worker by 8.0 percentage points (11%). The effect is concentrated among workers who perceive a higher risk of problems arising with the job (14.6 percentage points). Anonymity also increases the probability of naming a worker whom respondents perceive as able and reliable. This suggests that anticipated blame may keep job information from the workers firms would most value. Workers' fear is not unfounded: in a partially incentivized vignette experiment, the share willing to give up endowment to punish the friend who shared a job rises to 45% when the employer underpays, a fourfold increase over full payment, even though the friend had no control over payment. Workers also report that when jobs they shared turned out badly, recipients responded with conflict, demands for compensation, and reduced social and financial exchange. These findings show how anticipated blame can limit the flow of job information through social networks, potentially reducing their ability to lower search costs for workers and firms.