Max Pienkny

Northwestern University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Applied Micro, Industrial Organization, Health

Job market paper

The Safety Cost of Attribute-Based Environmental Regulation: Evidence from Fuel-Economy Standards

This paper studies how the design of emissions standards affects road safety. U.S. fuel-economy and greenhouse-gas standards are indexed to vehicle footprint, with larger vehicles facing less stringent targets. While intended to accommodate vehicles of different sizes, this design rewards manufacturers for making their vehicles larger, which can relax the effective standard and make roads more dangerous for pedestrians and occupants of smaller vehicles. Exploiting variation in the regulatory reward for enlargement across vehicles, I show that vehicles facing greater upsizing pressure grew disproportionately once footprint indexing began and that road deaths increased as these vehicles entered local fleets. To examine whether emissions can be reduced without these safety costs, I develop and estimate an equilibrium model of vehicle demand and design in a market with tradable compliance credits. Because tighter standards raise the price of compliance credits, they raise the value of enlargement whenever targets are indexed to size. Counterfactuals show that removing the reward for size while adjusting average stringency to keep emissions unchanged would have averted about 2,900 road deaths per year from 2013 to 2024. While making the existing indexed standard more stringent would have reduced emissions but increased road deaths, pairing this tightening with a one-quarter reduction in the extra emissions allowed for each additional square foot would have delivered nearly the same emissions reduction as tightening alone while reducing road deaths below existing levels.