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Fields
Industrial Organization, Labor, Econometrics
Job market paper
Multi-unit Collective Bargaining in the Presence of Labor Market Power
Collective bargaining is one of the primary institutions through which workers can counteract employers’ monopsony power, but its effectiveness depends on how bargaining is structured. This paper studies multi-unit bargaining—unions that negotiate with several firms rather than a single employer—and its effects on wages, employment, and welfare. We develop and estimate an equilibrium model of wage determination through bargaining in which firms retain the right to manage. We show that multi-unit unions have an incentive to internalize “employment diversion”: raising wages at one firm shifts employment away from the other firms they represent, which dampens their incentive to push wages up. We estimate the model on matched employer-employee and tax records from Chilean manufacturing, where single- and multi-unit bargaining coexist. Multi-unit unions hold substantially more bargaining power than single-unit unions, and this advantage dominates the dampening effect of employment diversion: equalizing bargaining power across union types and removing diversion internalization lowers wages by 3.6% and employment by 10.5% for workers covered by multi-unit unions. Bargaining power gains alone raise wages by 3.9% and employment by 11.4%, while employment diversion alone lowers wages by 0.3% and employment by 0.9%. Because most firms in our sample are supply-constrained, internalizing diversion pushes wages further below the competitive level, so the case for centralized bargaining depends on the balance of employer and union market power.