Shuo Yang

National University of Singapore · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Political Economy, Theory, Development

Job market paper

Credible Alliances and Balance of Power

We study a model of conflict and alliances in international relations. States are endowed with military strength and may form alliances to attack other states or defend themselves from attack. A key element of our theory is credibility: an alliance is credible if it is capable of sustaining peace among its own members after victory. The model yields novel predictions about the organisation of international systems: (i) systems of three states are stable if and only if the strongest power is checked by the other two combined; (ii) a more equal distribution of power can hamper stability; and (iii) stronger states may be more vulnerable to conquest. We relate these theoretical findings to historical evidence, especially from the Three Kingdoms periods in China and Korea, the contemporary hegemony of the United States, and the rise of China.