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Theory, Behavioral & Experimental
Job market paper
Reputational Bargaining with Learning
I study negotiations in which parties may adopt obstinate bargaining positions and claim that they cannot accept less than certain minimum terms, but public information can reveal whether these positions are genuine or strategic postures. I show that such revelations can trigger haggling over terms while placing the exposed party at a bargaining disadvantage. I then examine how anticipated information shapes earlier decisions to hold firm or concede. Negotiations can begin in deadlock, move through a phase in which pressure to concede shifts between the parties, and eventually reach a phase in which both face pressure to concede. Both haggling and deadlock are detrimental to welfare, but deadlock can generate substantial losses even when agreement is almost certainly feasible. Improved access to information, such as faster due diligence, can worsen outcomes by postponing voluntary concessions, even though evidence arrives sooner. The model's empirical implications include phases of declining conflict-resolution hazard rates and duration-dependent winning probabilities, qualitatively consistent with strike evidence.