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Industrial Organization, Applied Micro, Behavioral & Experimental
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Price Controls in Disaster Insurance
This paper studies the affordability–availability trade-off in California’s disaster insurance market. Homeowners insurers face repricing regulations intended to maintain affordable premiums as disaster risk increases, but restrictions on price adjustment can reduce insurer profitability and contribute to non-renewals, particularly in high-risk areas. Using ZIP-code-level data on policies, premiums, and insurance characteristics together with firm-level profitability measures, I develop a structural model of household insurance demand and insurer pricing to estimate the key demand and supply parameters governing this market. On the demand side, a mixed logit framework in which mortgage requirements raise households’ value of insurance and price sensitivity varies with income, captures substitution between private insurance, the public option, and remaining uninsured. On the supply side, insurers compete à la Bertrand subject to repricing frictions generated by the rate-filing approval process. Identification exploits an exogenous increase in rate-filing approval delays beginning in 2020 and the resulting variation in insurers' ability to adjust premiums. I use the estimated model to study the affordability–availability trade-off under counterfactual policies including price caps and restrictions on non-renewals.