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Environmental & Energy, Theory, Behavioral & Experimental, Econometrics, Urban & Regional
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How Spillovers Erode Participation in Conservation Buybacks: Evidence from the Texas Inshore Shrimp Fishery
Buyback programs are widely used to reduce overcapitalization and generate social benefits in settings such as land retirement, groundwater conservation, and fisheries. Yet evaluations often stop at program boundaries, even though removals can generate spillovers: displaced activity may move elsewhere, while those who remain benefit from a replenished resource. I study how these gains feed back into buyback program participation. As capacity is removed, the continuation value of remaining participants rises, creating an incentive to hold out rather than exit. Successful removals can therefore weaken the program participation required for further success. I quantify this feedback-loop using the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department's 26-year inshore shrimp license buyback as a testbed. I estimate a two-stage structural model of vessels' spatial fishing choices and license-retirement decisions, then use it to simulate continuation values and reconstruct harvest and auction activity when vessel-level data are unavailable. I find that for every six active license-holders who bid, roughly one who would otherwise have participated holds out as stock recovery makes staying more valuable. Program effectiveness is further constrained by two margins: approximately three-quarters of retired licenses were already inactive, and surviving vessels replace more of the retired harvest in denser bay systems. Restricting purchases to active licenses would have retired 80% more trawl-days per license (307 against 171). Together, the results show that conservation buybacks can undermine participation and additionality through the benefits they create for those who remain.