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Industrial Organization, Applied Micro
Job market paper
Compliance Spillovers and the Limits of Free-Entry Neutrality
When large firms face cost shocks, does free entry protect consumers? I study a free-entry oligopoly in which compliance costs depend on rivals' compliance. An incumbent cost shock changes long-run output if and only if a new entry–compliance wedge is nonzero and compliance spills over across firms. The wedge measures how industry compliance changes when entrant output replaces incumbent output. Entry also creates a compliance externality that can reinforce or reverse the classic excess-entry result. U.S. environmental data show that compliance obligations grow far less than proportionally with firm size. In a calibration, a 10 percent increase in incumbents' marginal costs raises fringe entry by 43 percent and industry compliance by 35 percent, lowering output under a rivalrous spillover.