Jason Paulo Tayawa

Ohio State University · Economics · 2026–27 job market · Postdoc at Ohio State University

Fields

Behavioral & Experimental, Theory

Job market paper

Paying Too Much Attention: Theory and Evidence

Why do people gather more information than needed? We propose an inattentive agent with distorted beliefs and implementation noise. Such an agent may hold under-responsive beliefs—beliefs that move too little given the signal—and therefore undervalue information and acquire more of it. We show when their choice-frequency data can satisfy the canonical test of rational inattention. Even then, estimated attention-cost functions from choice frequencies can be misspecified, identifying some cost families only up to a bias. In a controlled laboratory setting, we find that participants respond monotonically to rewards and beliefs, as characterized. Implementation is noisy: participants choose the optimal action given beliefs 94% of the time. Beliefs are distorted: 65% are under-responsive. As the model predicts, those with more under-responsive beliefs acquire more information. Estimating costs from choices assigns less than a quarter of rationally inattentive participants to the correct cost family. Distortion and noise embedded in choice frequencies cost 25% of optimal profits. Choices alone obscure over-acquisition and mismeasure attention and its costs.