Suha Kim

Ohio State University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Behavioral & Experimental, Theory

Job market paper

Information Representations and Choices in Costly Information Acquisition

Do people acquire the same information when asked in accuracy or sampling size terms? Rational inattention models often treat information choice as choosing an accuracy level, yet the same choice can also be represented as choosing a sampling size. Theory treats these representations as equivalent, so revealed information-cost structure should be stable across them. We design a laboratory environment to test whether it is. Subjects choose from the same feasible information set, either by accuracy level or by the corresponding sampling size. We vary priors, rewards, and representation of information and evaluate behavior using the two major classes of models—Prior-Invariant (PI) and Uniformly Posterior-Separable (UPS) costs. Furthermore, we let subjects select the information from their preferred representation. Both classes of models are empirically valid in either representation of information, with PI observed more often in the sampling representation and UPS in the accuracy representation. Behavior is consistent: 60% of subjects are best fit by the same model in either representation. Even when consistent, different representations can reduce overall information. Representation choice is also consistent: 75% of subjects choose a single representation more often, with a majority choosing the sampling-size representation, contrasting with the modeling approach of Rational Inattention. Theoretically equivalent representations need not be behaviorally equivalent. The results invite future study about transporting revealed information costs across elicitation environments.