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Labor, Public, Health
Job market paper
Pension Design for Couples and Singles
Couples can share household expenses, which reduces their cost of living. Many social insurance programmes therefore pay lower rates per person to couples compared to singles. How does this change relationship choices? This paper exploits administrative data and institutional features of the Danish pension system to show that the separation risk increases by 18% in response to financial incentives in a state pension of this kind. This implies that the overall share of singles in the population increases by 2.3% for a 50,000 DKK (about 7,400 USD) difference in annual income by relationship status. We develop a limited-commitment life-cycle model with endogenous divorce and retirement to evaluate the fiscal and welfare consequences of this policy. We show that the mechanical cost of paying higher rates to singles makes up 54.4% of the total fiscal cost, with the remainder arising due to the behavioural responses in divorce and retirement timing. But while the policy redistributes from couples to singles, it also provides insurance against the risks of divorce and widowhood. For this reason, 40% of those starting as married prefer the status quo with the lower rate for couples to a revenue-neutral equalisation of pensions.