Sanjari Kalantri

University of Oxford · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory

Job market paper

Information Provision with Intertemporal Externalities

How should an expert provide information when the decision she induces today affects the state of the world tomorrow? I study a dynamic persuasion model in which a long-lived Sender provides information about an evolving state to a sequence of short-lived Receivers who choose between two actions, high and low. In each period, the Sender has a weak ordinal preference for the high action over the low and the good state over the bad, whereas each Receiver wants the high action only in the good state. Crucially, each Receiver's action affects the state the next one faces, creating intertemporal externalities. When the high action improves the future state, the Sender's ordinal preferences alone make it optimal to maximise the probability of the high action every period, as in the static problem. When it worsens the future state, the optimal policy depends on the cardinal features of her preferences: besides maximising the probability of either action, the Sender may fully reveal the state or leave the Receiver uncertain after every signal. Beyond what information to disclose, the optimal policy determines when to disclose: the action each disclosure induces dictates whether the next one is needed. For each policy, I show when the Sender discloses again immediately, stays silent for several periods, or eventually stops disclosing altogether.