Stefania Merone

University of Oxford · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Behavioral & Experimental

Job market paper

Trust, but Verify: a Theory of Selective Source Verification

When should individuals verify the reliability of an information source? I consider a Bayesian decision-maker who receives a signal from a source of uncertain quality and can pay a cost to learn its accuracy. I show that verification is only valuable for an intermediate range of prior beliefs where uncertainty about source reliability remains sufficiently high and there is still substantial scope for belief updating. More importantly, verification is selective: when all sources are reliable, sources of signals that contradict prior beliefs are systematically more valuable to verify, implying that asymmetric verification can arise from fully rational behavior. I then characterize how this result changes when one source type is unreliable. Finally, I explore departures from Bayesian updating, and show that motivated reasoning and confirmatory bias are not only unnecessary to explain the verification patterns they are commonly associated with, but may even attenuate or reverse them.