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Political Economy, Development, Economic History
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Land Without Masters: Local Political Effects of Peru's Land Reform
Can historically excluded groups develop capacities to compete for political power under autocracy? Can these capacities outlive the regime? This study examines Peru's 1969 agrarian reform, which under military rule expropriated large estates from landed elites and transferred the land to newly formed cooperatives of predominantly indigenous peasants, long excluded from politics. I estimate the reform's effects on local political competition, electoral participation, and candidate selection once elections resumed, focusing on the erosion of landed elites' electoral control and the rise of collective organization as potential mechanisms. Identification exploits regional office locations and reform-zone boundaries established a decade earlier for other purposes. Three designs combine office proximity, within-zone border discontinuities, and district-by-election variation. Beginning with the return to democracy in 1980, the reform raised the number of parties contesting local elections, narrowed winning margins, and increased indigenous representation among elected mayors. To interpret these findings, I extend a model of electoral control in which expropriation weakens landlord power and persistent agrarian organization gives beneficiaries political weight. Nonparametric mediation tests support this reading. The share of farmers in agrarian organizations and left voting in the 1980s can each account for the entire effect on the number of parties, while turnout responds only where the exit of incumbent elites combines with local agrarian organization. The economic changes the reform set off cannot fully explain either response.