Arifah Hasanbasri

University of Pittsburgh · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Econometrics, Industrial Organization, Development

Job market paper

How Do Suppliers Choose in a Platform Market? A Case Study of the Game Industry

Network externalities make platform entry difficult, since a new platform's appeal to one side of the market depends on participation from the other. One lever available to an entrant is exclusivity, compensating suppliers to commit exclusively, though this reduces the variety any single platform offers. We study this tradeoff in the sixth-generation home video game console industry—incumbents Sony (PlayStation 2) and Nintendo (GameCube), and entrant Microsoft (Xbox)—developing a dynamic structural model in which third-party developers jointly choose which platform bundle to release on and when to launch, letting us recover development costs, cost synergies, and exclusivity benefits separately by developer type. We find that Xbox paid a significant exclusivity premium over PlayStation 2 on average, but this premium is not uniform across developer type for either platform. Xbox paid large developers more, consistent with foreclosure, while PlayStation 2 paid small developers more, consistent with retention; a further reversal on Xbox, where small developers' benefit is larger relative to their own cost, points to a cost advantage small developers hold on the entrant that large developers do not. Counterfactual simulations show developers respond to losing an exclusivity incentive by diversifying across platforms only when no competing exclusive arrangement remains available; otherwise, they relocate to the rival platform's terms.