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Fields
Labor, Political Economy, Economic History
Job market paper
Fathers in Office, Sons in Jobs: Intergenerational Returns to Local Political Office
How does entry into local political office affect the long-run labor-market outcomes of officeholders' children, and what role do merit-based civil service institutions play? To study these questions, I construct a new dataset by digitizing rosters of township, village, and city officials in early twentieth-century Ohio and linking them to full-count U.S. censuses. This allows me to trace their adult children's labor-market outcomes from 1900 to 1940. Using a matched difference-in-differences design, I find that fathers' entry into office increases sons' occupational income score and white-collar employment, with gains persisting for decades after fathers leave office. In 1940, officials' sons earn about 13% more in annual wage income than their matched counterparts, while effects on daughters are more limited in this period of low female labor force participation. These gains are driven by increased access to both public-sector employment and private-sector white-collar jobs. Public-sector gains are particularly larger where local officials have greater hiring discretion and for sons with lower pre-office occupational standing. Exploiting the staggered adoption of municipal civil service reforms across cities, I find that civil service reforms do not eliminate the intergenerational political advantages. Instead, sons' private-sector white-collar gains become significantly larger when fathers enter office after the reform.