Karl Schulze

Princeton University · Economics · 2026–27 job market · Postdoc

Fields

Labor, Education, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

College Discretion in Admissions and Student Achievement

This paper studies the aggregate and distributional consequences of allowing colleges discretion over whom to admit. Two distinctive features of Chile's centralized assignment system allow us to make progress in identifying colleges' objectives. First, the admissions rules chosen by each college-major program are publicly observed. Second, a 2014 reform expanded programs' discretion by giving them the option to increase emphasis on high school class rank. Programs responded differently: many maintained their admissions rules, while those that placed more emphasis on class rank admitted more low-SES and female students. To quantify the importance of discretion beyond this reform, we estimate an equilibrium model of students' preferences for programs, programs' preferences for students, and their interaction in determining graduation. Match effects matter: the same program raises graduation more for some students than for others, allowing colleges to improve aggregate graduation by admitting students based on fit. Exploiting observed rule choices, we infer that programs value graduation but differ in how they trade it off against socioeconomic composition, consistent with their differential response to the reform. In counterfactuals that limit or expand discretion, lotteries reduce segregation but also graduation, while test-only admissions and full discretion increase segregation without raising graduation. The results support delegating some admissions authority to colleges, but with guardrails to ensure alignment with a policymaker's goals.