Qiyuan Zheng

Princeton University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Behavioral & Experimental

Job market paper

Regulating Discretion through Information

This paper studies how an organization designs information for an agent who shares its goals but also seeks personal gains. The agent privately knows how different factors contribute to shared goals but has incentives to exaggerate the importance of some of these factors for personal gain. To limit the influence of personal gains while preserving the agent's discretion, the organization offers a menu of disclosure rules, each specifying what the agent learns before making a decision. I characterize the optimal menu. When the agent has a systematic incentive to overstate how much one factor contributes to shared goals, the optimal disclosure rules pair favorable information about that factor with less favorable information about his personal gains. By reducing the rewards gained through exaggeration, the optimal menu helps the organization elicit the agent's judgment about shared goals through his choice of disclosure rule.