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Job market paper
Hidden Information and Worse Discrimination
How should regulators design the information available to employers to balance efficiency and fairness in hiring? I study a model in which applicants differ along multiple attributes, some potentially protected, such as criminal history, and others less sensitive, such as education. I measure discrimination along each attribute by the difference in its average value between hired and rejected applicants. I show that prohibiting employers from observing a protected attribute can backfire, exacerbating discrimination along both the concealed attribute and others. This finding sheds light on evidence from Agan and Starr (2018), who document a widening racial gap in callbacks following the removal of criminal-history questions. Moving beyond outright concealment, I characterize the full set of optimal information policies. Every optimal policy induces the firm to hire exactly half the applicants. For each attribute, its average among hired applicants is the same across all optimal policies. Moreover, having more of an attribute that the firm values can be a disadvantage in hiring. I characterize exactly when such reversals occur under every optimal policy.