Yuci Zhou

Princeton University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Health, Public

Job market paper

Public Procurement and Private Product Distribution: Evidence from WIC and the Infant Formula Market

Governments can lower the cost of providing in-kind benefits by restricting beneficiaries to a single manufacturer's products, which induces them to compete for procurement contracts through discounts. When private retailers distribute these benefits, their responses to procurement rules can affect the choices available to private-market consumers. We study this tradeoff in infant formula procurement by the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), where three manufacturers bid for contracts that require retailers to keep the contracted brand in stock. We find evidence that retailers' stocking decisions are a driver of the increase in the contracted brand's private-market share. We rationalize this with a model in which consumers substitute across brands during stockouts, so keeping the contracted brand reliably in stock lowers retailers' return to keeping competing brands in stock. Counterfactual simulations show that, among designs that keep formula free for beneficiaries, contracting with two brands and requiring retailers to keep both in stock raises annual private-market consumer surplus by $340 million (12% of current private-market formula spending), while leaving net program spending essentially unchanged. This design broadens product availability for private-market consumers through stocking requirements, while preserving competition for contracts, since manufacturers still face the threat of exclusion.