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International, Development, Industrial Organization
Job market paper
Quality and Outsourcing in Advanced Manufacturing Networks
In production networks, upstream markups give downstream firms an incentive to make inputs in-house, whereas a comparative advantage in their core production pushes them to outsource. We formalize this make-or-buy trade-off in a bipartite network model with input-output quality complementarities, endogenous entry, and endogenous quality choices, both upstream and downstream. Fit to a large set of moments describing Taiwanese advanced manufacturers, the model explains two patterns we document in firm-to-firm transaction data: high-quality firms outsource more, and they buy disproportionately from high-quality suppliers. We then use the estimated model for counterfactual policy experiments. Policies limiting the market power of upstream firms can reduce welfare despite lessening the distortion from double marginalization. The reason is that markups also finance suppliers' quality investment; removing them causes upstream firms to exit, forcing downstream firms into inefficient in-house production and lowering output quality. Tax credits for input purchases can instead raise welfare, because they address the distortion from upstream markups without shifting input production toward less efficient firms.