Website CV Paper
Fields
Industrial Organization, Applied Micro
Job market paper
Auctions vs. Posted Prices: When Do Sellers Switch Formats?
Sellers often do not know the demand for their goods. An auction reveals it but risks no sale and adds delay; posting a price is immediate and certain but ends demand learning. This paper studies this trade-off on an online used-car platform, where sellers repeatedly auction the same car and may switch to a posted price. In a dynamic discrete–continuous choice model with Bayesian learning, risk-averse sellers update their beliefs based on auction outcomes and, in each period, choose a format and a secret reserve or a posted price. Repeated auctions of the same car identify how informative auctions are, and posted prices after a switch identify the seller's risk aversion and delay costs. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood using an expectation–maximization algorithm with a machine-learning first stage. A single auction resolves most of a seller's uncertainty, learning delivers roughly 70% of the value of full information, and bad news triggers prompt switching. The two formats are complements, and mandating a switch after two auctions shortens time on market at no cost to sellers. A reserve-recommendation tool and a standing guaranteed-purchase offer each raise seller welfare; the offer is taken up precisely after sellers learn that demand is weak.