Grace Molina

Rice University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory

Job market paper

Team Production with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

The main challenge in team production is that individual actions are often unobserved, incentivizing team members to exploit their private information and free-ride at the team's expense. To address this problem, this paper formulates and solves a model of team production with adverse selection and moral hazard. It examines a team partitioned into two groups. Within the team, there is an informed agent with private information about a productivity parameter that dictates first-best actions. The informed agent reports the productivity parameter to the team. Based on the report, each agent takes a non-observable action at a private cost. Each group produces an observable outcome, and the sum of these two outcomes constitutes a joint outcome allocated among the agents. Assuming agents have unlimited liability, the main results demonstrate that there exist budget-balanced sharing rules that induce truthful reporting and first-best actions. These results establish that partitioning a team into two groups is sufficient to achieve efficiency, obviating the need for additional information about agents' actions.