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Job market paper
Probationary Periods: Incentivizing Effort and Facilitating Learning
I study a principal-agent problem between an infinitely lived firm and finitely lived workers. Each worker's type is initially unknown to both parties, and high effort helps to better identify it. My model is built on Camargo and Pastorino (2016), who show that probationary periods (commitment to employment) can be part of the equilibria only when the workers' effort has a delayed impact, if both the type space and the output space are binary. I show that if the type space and the output space contain at least three elements, and the workers' outside option gradually increases depending on their past performance, probationary periods are part of the equilibria, even when effort has no delayed impact. This formulation helps to explain environments where a worker who produces medium output for more than one period can secure an alternative job matching his skills, even though the firm is better off switching to a new candidate.