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Macroeconomics
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Bank–Firm Relationships under Aggregate Shocks: Monitoring Costs and Separation Frictions
This paper quantifies the aggregate cost of inefficient separations in bank-firm lending relationships and evaluates the policies used to preserve these relationships. Over the course of a relationship, the bank builds up information about the firm through costly monitoring, and this information is lost when the relationship ends. A separation is inefficient when the bank or the firm unilaterally ends the relationship, even though the joint surplus remains positive. I build a directed search model of the credit market, calibrated to the Portuguese credit register, in which monitoring costs decline with relationship tenure and loan terms are fixed when the relationship forms, thereby generating inefficient separations. Consumption is 8.3 percent higher under the planner's continuation rule than in the market economy, mainly because replacement relationships pay the high monitoring costs of a new match again. An aggregate downturn does not raise the number of inefficient separations; it shifts them toward banks ending young relationships, from 6 to 22 percent of all separations, and the least productive firms lose access to new credit. Of the downturn's 2.7 percent consumption loss, a full moratorium on foreclosure recovers a quarter, and a subsidy paid to firms recovers 12 percent. The same subsidy paid to banks increases the loss by a tenth: it encourages bank entry, which improves matched firms' outside options and raises the number of firm-initiated separations.