Nathaniel Butler Blondel

Sciences Po · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Macroeconomics, Finance, Industrial Organization, Political Economy

Job market paper

Financial Stability and Fiscal Dominance by Proxy

Financial institutions' reliance on public debt is usually seen as a source of fiscal discipline. I show that it can also give a government leverage over an independent central bank. Both authorities bear the output loss from sovereign default, but only the government values the tax costs it saves. At the government's margin of default, the central bank therefore accepts some inflation to secure repayment and preserve financial stability. A government can thus use the financial sector as its proxy to extract monetary accommodation. Financial repression can nonetheless preserve monetary dominance. Requiring financial institutions to hold more public debt raises the borrowing needed to make default credible, which dissuades the government from seeking accommodation. The assignment of regulatory authority can therefore determine which fiscal–monetary regime prevails.